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Ancestral constitutions in fourth-century BCE 
Athenian political argument: genre and re-invention1 
When the Athenian general Phocion conceded his city to the Macedonian regent 
Antipater in 321 BCE, a decree declared the restoration of Athens’ ancestral 
constitution (patrios politeia); from now on the city would be run according to the 
laws of Solon, the revered father of democracy.2 The reported outcome was that 
Athens’ beleaguered democracy was effectively dismantled, its leading orators 
handed over to the Macedonians and its poorest citizens, who had powered the city’s 
fleets to domination of the Greek world in the previous century, deprived of 
citizenship and resettled in colonies in Thrace.3 Ancient biographical tradition places 
Phocion as Plato’s student, and Antipater as Aristotle’s executor, but the messy 
negotiations that ended Athenian democracy seem to owe little to Plato’s idealism or 
the tradition of Solon as sage and lawgiver.4 
For almost a century, since Athens’ previous brush with oligarchy, the idea that there 
was an authentic Athenian patrios politeia had featured in political debate and 
theorising, even as its features, definition and attribution to more-or-less historical 
lawgivers such as Solon changed at the hands of its disparate proponents. Emerging 
from the contest between supporters of varieties of democracy and oligarchy towards 
the end of the Peloponnesian War, the patrios politeia began to appear as a model 
constitution in new works of political theory, alongside imagined utopias and often 
supplanting idealised versions of Sparta.5 While the more extreme oligarchs of 411 
and 404/3 had looked to Sparta for a model constitution, their failure, and that of 
                                                
1 I would like to express thanks here to the Arts and Humanities Research Council, the Faculty of 
Classics, University of Cambridge, and Lucy Cavendish College, all of which supported the research of 
which this dissertation, submitted for the MPhil in June 2010, formed a part. Thanks are also due to 
Professor Paul Cartledge and Professor Malcolm Schofield, who supervised my postgraduate work at 
Cambridge. Papers drawn from this dissertation also benefitted from comments from seminar and 
conference audiences in Cambridge and Liverpool.  
2 τὴν πάτριον ἀπὸ τιµήµατος πολιτείαν, Plut. Phoc. 27.3; κατὰ τοὺς Σόλωνος νόµους, 
Diod. Sic. 18.18.5. 
3 Diod. Sic. 18.18.4, Tritle 1988: 131-40. The view that 323 BCE marks a turning point for Athenian 
democracy is controversial; much historical evidence, notably epigraphic evidence, points to 
continuation of institutions and practices rather than change. The idea that submission to Macedon 
made a substantive change to Athenian politics may reflect the idealisation of the classical period by 
later sources looking back from, for example, the different political world of imperial Rome. However, 
such views reflect the suspicion that beneath the continuation of institutions, there was some kind of 
change in Athenian politics remains – even if that change is at an extremely abstract level. 
4 Plut. Phoc. 4.2; Diog. Laert. 5.1.11. 
5 Finley 1975: 35-40; Hansen 2005: 14-15; Mossé 1978: 81-2. 
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Sparta as hegemon of the Greek world and military power, had undermined the appeal 
of Athenian political Laconism.6 Despite Xenophon’s attempt to rehabilitate the 
Spartan model in the Lacedaimoniōn Politeia, theorists needed a new ideal politeia. 
The concept of the patrios politeia enabled critics and theorists to re-invent Athenian 
democracy and to criticise its institutions while avoiding the suggestion that they were 
crypto-oligarchs or apologists for Sparta. Placed in the imaginary Athens of the city’s 
own rhetoric, its counterfactual existence could be presented as a realised utopia.  
Isocrates and Plato extended the process of removing the patrios politeia from its 
historical context, competitively fabricating ever more extravagant pre-histories for 
the Athenian constitution in an imagined, mythicised past. Their works exploit the 
distinction between the traditional genres of Athenian democratic public discourse, 
such as the funeral speech, and literary versions of them circulated in writing to an 
elite audience, in order to question Athenian values and to educate the elite.7 While 
Plato’s playful literary re-inventions are wide-ranging (as Nightingale, drawing on 
Todorov’s genre theory, shows), Isocrates re-fashions the spoken rhetorical forms of 
public discourse of the Athenian democracy as a private intra-elite written discourse.8  
Isocrates develops his model of the ancestral Athenian constitution over his long 
career, refining its details between the Panegyricus of 380 BCE and the 
Panathenaicus of 339 BCE. Xenophon too seems to find the original Athenian genre 
of political theoretical analysis and argument, the politeia, insufficient, following his 
Spartan politeia with works of history (Hellenica) and (fictionalised) biography 
(Anabasis and Cyropaedia) within which he can expound his political theory and 
philosophy. Isocrates and Xenophon promoted political theories based on an idealised 
past, that resemble those of 20th-century proponents of elitist democracy such as 
Schumpeter, with their emphasis on the restriction of leadership roles to the selected 
few and mass participation to occasional opportunities to assent via elections.9 
Plato bases his criticism of ancestral constitution models on the problems raised by 
using historical examples as political ideals. He criticises the use of Athenian self-
image and mythology through pastiches of funeral speech in the Menexenus and 
                                                
6 Cartledge 1999: 313-4; Tigerstedt 1965: 154-9. 
7 Nicolai 2004: 13-29; Pownall 2007: 235-7; Robb 1994: 214-51. 
8 Nightingale 1995: 3-12; Todorov 1990: 13-26. 
9 Held 2006: 125-57. 
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history in Laws III-IV, and magnificently re-invents them in the story of Athens and 
Atlantis in the Timaeus/Critias. Plato uses the distinction he draws between the 
serious and playful uses of writing (Phdr. 274d-278b) to structure these critiques of 
patrios politeia arguments.10 His Socrates observes that lawgivers such as Solon 
should have used this distinction (Phdr. 278c3-4). 
The patrios politeia – a contested concept 
The concept of the ‘patrios politeia’ was contested from its first appearance during 
the turmoil of the final stages of the Peloponnesian War and the successive Athenian 
oligarchies. Whereas democrats sought to restore democracy in its most recent form, 
others saw an opportunity to wind back some of the fifth century’s political reforms to 
an earlier stage, which could be valorised as the authentic form of democracy while 
reducing the power of the demos. The sophist Thrasymachus provides late fifth-
century evidence that the concept of patrios politeia was contested, although he 
claims that this conflict could easily be resolved by referring to arguments from the 
past (λόγων τῶν παλαιοτέρων).11 
Finley argues that the desire to return to a past constitution is a feature of ‘sharp 
political conflict’.12 While this may be true of the situation in 411/403, the current 
state of Finley’s third example of ancestral constitution arguments, the continuing 
interest in re-interpreting the writings of the USA’s founding fathers, suggests a 
longer-term breakdown of political consensus, much more similar to the different 
Athenian situation in the mid-fourth century.13  
Diodorus Siculus’ (much later, though probably derived from the fourth-century 
historian Ephorus) account of the Spartan-mandated peace settlement of 403 (14.3.3) 
captures the distinct uses of the term well.14 One (democratic) group wants their 
fathers’ constitution, τὴν τῶν πατέρων πολιτείαν, emphasising their desire for a return 
to the most recent version of democracy. The other, oligarchic, side appears to place 
the ancestral constitution (τὴν παλαιὰν κατάστασιν) in a more distant past. This is the 
move that enabled supporters of the patrios politeia to argue ostensibly for 
                                                
10 Derrida 1981: 73-8; Jouët-Pastré 2001: 34-6. 
11 DK85 B1; Fuks 1971: 102-05.  
12 Finley 1975: 35, 40-2. Finley’s consciously rhetorical inaugural lecture aims to match the Athenian 
example with the 17th-century English political argument studied by Pocock (Pocock 1987). 
13 Finley 1975: 42-3. 
14 Fuks 1971: 63-7. 
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democracy, but exclude the constitutional changes of the fifth century that established 
the features of Athenian radical democracy.  
The Aristotelian Ath. Pol. suggests that the nature of the ancestral constitution was 
debated during the 411 oligarchies and their aftermath (29-33), but the extent to 
which these chapters quote genuine documents or decrees (such as the Rider of 
Kleitophon, 29.3) is uncertain.15 The eagerness of the returned democrats to re-
establish the traditional nomoi, their ascription to Solon, and confusion about their 
substance, are hinted at in Andocides’ use of the decree of Teisamenos, by which the 
democracy had been restored using Solon’s laws, in his defence against impiety 
charges.16 The returned democrats sought the nomoi needed to restore the democracy, 
while their opponents argued for earlier laws that restricted democracy. Whether these 
Solonian nomoi had ever existed in any physical sense as decrees inscribed on stone is 
doubtful, but the search was for positive laws (nomoi), not an idealised way of life 
(politeia).17 
Both parts of ‘patrios politeia’ were contested. The description patrios was 
ambiguous. Fourth-century orators often used patrios to refer to religious tradition or 
civic custom currently in use, as Thucydides did in describing the funeral speech as 
being τῷ πατρίῳ νόµῳ (Thuc. 2.34.1).18 This sense of ‘traditional’ extends to political 
use; Thucydides shows the democratic forces at Samos arguing that the oligarchs 
have wrongly dissolved the traditional laws (ἡµαρτηκέναι τοὺς πατρίους νόµους 
καταλύσαντας, Thuc. 8.76.6). In Xenophon’s Hellenica, the democrat Thrasybulus 
requires the defeated oligarchs to obey the patrioi nomoi as a condition of their return 
to Athens (Hell. 2.4.42).  
Politeia also extended its meaning over this period; originally a quality applied to 
individuals, the capability of being a citizen, it came to refer to the mixture of ethos 
and laws that went to define the character of a polis, and also a text discussing the 
system in question.19 The earliest free-standing politeia text, the pseudo-Xenophontic 
Athenaiōn Politeia, is firmly focused on the present of successful imperial Athens and 
                                                
15 Rhodes 1992: 376-7. 
16 Andocides 1.81-4; Fuks 1971: 34-40. 
17 Rhodes 2006; Ruschenbusch 1958; Walters 1976: 135-8. 
18 Lys. 1.30, 30.21, 30.29, 31.31; Finley 1975: 37; Walters 1976: 133-5. 
19 Bordes 1982: 127-37. 
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its roots in Athenian democracy, which is opposed to oligarchy rather than seen as 
modifiable.20 Aristotle later schematised possible politeiai, describing different forms 
of democracy ranging from moderate to extreme (Pol. 4.4.1291b30-1292a38). 
Thucydides shows an early stage of this distinction: in arguing for change in the 
constitution the pro-oligarchs first demand the outright end to democracy (Thuc. 
8.48.5), then a change in the type of democracy in Athens (µὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον 
δηµοκρατουµένοις, 8.53.1).21 The mixed constitution emerged from the same period 
(Thuc. 8.97.2) as fourth-century theorists’ ideal, as its measure and balance was seen 
as a defence against the instability of pure forms of democracy or oligarchy. 
Hansen suggested that patrios politeia was little more than a vague ‘hurrah-word’, 
equivalent to the use of ‘democracy’ in modern political debate; however, it seems 
more likely that the different uses of the term reflect different sides’ claims.22 An 
elaborate process of mythologisation and the retrospective creation of laws and ideas 
attributed to Solon continued throughout the century, both in public debate and in the 
texts discussed below, although the precise mix of Solon’s politeia was contested 
(Arist. Pol. 2.12.1273b35-74a22); Ath. Pol. 7-11, drawing on different sources, gives 
a much more detailed (although almost certainly imaginary) list of institutional 
reforms attributed to Solon, that well match the features of ancestral constitutions.23 
Although Finley argues that nomoi and politeia should not be distinguished, this 
wider sense of politeia, which includes details of education and culture, became the 
more important in the fourth-century political debate. 24 Although the later debate was 
conducted through the reconstruction of Athenian myth and ideology, and the 
incorporation of Solon into it as a ‘founding father’, its focus was different.25 Aristotle 
carefully notes that Lycurgus and Solon established both nomoi and politeiai (Pol. 
2.12.1273b33-4), and in Isocrates’ political theory the idea of the patrios politeia 
becomes an all-encompassing moral and political framework of unwritten law, 
contrasted with specific nomoi (Areopagiticus 41). On this basis Isocrates is not, as 
Jaeger suggests, simply the heir of a Theramenean moderate ‘party’ from the earlier 
                                                
20 Most probably dated to the 440s-420s; Gray 2007: 57-8. Bordes 1982: 139-63; Gray 2007: 51-4; 
Ober 1998: 14-6. 
21 Hornblower 2008: 912; Mossé 1978: 82. 
22 Hansen 1990b: 75-8. 
23 Hansen 1999: 296-300; Mossé 1979: 425-31. 
24 Finley 1975: 37. 
25 Mossé 1979: 434-6. 
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period seeking to reinstate former nomoi.26 But the separation was not complete: 
Athenian democratic institutions continued to evolve throughout the fourth century, 
often in directions suggested by patrios politeia arguments, moderating the former 
radical democracy into something which starts to resemble modern elitist models of 
democracy.27  
The rhetorical appeal to the past must have been attractive to fourth-century 
Athenians, conscious of their city’s decline and the superior achievements of their 
ancestors.28 Even at its height Athens had always grounded its superiority in appeals 
to a mythicised past, as expressed through the fifth-century institution of the public 
funeral speech.29 Two themes of the epitaphios, the historical evidence for Athenian 
greatness, and the nature of the Athenian politeia, merge in the ancestral constitution 
arguments of Isocrates and Plato. The ‘imaginary’ Athens of funeral speech rhetoric 
provided the ideal location for explorations of political possibilities and utopian 
constitutions.30 
Menexenus and Panegyricus: ancestral constitutions and public 
versus private speech 
Both Plato’s Menexenus and Isocrates’ Panegyricus re-work genres of Athenian 
public epideictic rhetoric as literary texts in order to examine ideas about Athenian 
democracy, including the ancestral constitution. Both writers reject democracy’s 
public platforms (implying their authors’ rejection of current democratic practice), 
where these genres belong, and address their work to small private audiences. By 
manipulating rhetorical genres, which in their public, spoken form exemplified 
Athenian democratic self-celebration, they produce multi-layered, ironic critiques of 
the politics of their time delivered through the different medium of the written word 
to a private audience opposed to the current version of Athenian democracy.31 Plato 
would later present the noisy debate of Athenian democracy as a cause of Athenian 
decline (Leg. 3.700a5-701b3). 
                                                
26 Jaeger 1940: 442-8. 
27 Hansen 1999: 296-304; Rhodes 2005: 279-81. 
28 Hansen 1990b: 72-4.  
29 Loraux 1986: 15-76. 
30 Loraux 1986: 328-38. 
31 Pownall 2007: 235-7. 
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The epitaphios delivered at the annual public funeral and commemoration of the 
Athenian war dead had an unusual status among the forms of public speech in Athens. 
It was given by an orator publicly selected (ᾑρηµένος ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως) for his 
individual worth (ἀξιώσει προήκῃ, Thuc. 2.34.6), an unusual procedure in democratic 
Athens where most roles were distributed by lot and only a handful of exceptional 
magistracies were elected.32 Unlike ordinary public speeches in the assembly and law-
court, funeral and other ceremonial orations received no direct reply or counter-
argument, again an extremely unusual situation in Athenian public speech, where 
speeches usually appear in opposed pairs, such as the agones of drama. The replies to 
funeral speeches appear within the differing renditions of the genre given by each 
speaker.  
Although the epitaphios became, as Loraux demonstrates, an important vehicle for 
analysis of the Athenian politeia, and possibly the only one available to democratic 
thinkers, its aristocratic process and incorporation of aristocratic values jar with the 
society it celebrates.33 This disjunction, along with its set topoi of Athenian 
foundation myths, military exploits and politics, seem to have rendered mock 
epitaphioi an attractive genre for fourth-century criticism of Athenian democracy.34 
Plato and Isocrates’ written works re-invent the genre to criticise Athenian democracy 
using its own tradition of self-praise, reworking myth and history in support of their 
arguments.  
Plato’s epitaphios delivers a complex set of criticisms of the use of funeral speech 
topoi in political rhetoric. The Menexenus wraps a sample epitaphios, attributed by 
Socrates to Aspasia, Pericles’ partner, in a brief dialogue; the attribution of an 
Athenian democratic speech to a non-Athenian woman is only one of the puzzles it 
contains.35 The dramatic date of the speech must postdate the latest event in its survey 
of Athenian history, the King’s Peace of 387/6, obviously long after Socrates’ 
execution in 399.36 This is a speech that could never have possibly been delivered, 
presented as made not to a public audience but to a single student in a private setting.  
                                                
32 Hansen 1999: 229-37. 
33 Loraux 1986: 202-20. 
34 Todd 2007: 151-3. 
35 Kahn 1963: 220-21. 
36 Salkever 1993: 135-6. 
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The speech is clearly a pastiche of the funeral speech genre, and not just the 
Thucydidean funeral speech.37 Pericles, or the Thucydidean presentation of him, is 
indeed an explicit target (Socrates claims the speech contains off-cuts from the speech 
which Aspasia allegedly wrote for Pericles, 236a8-b6), but, just as with Xenophon’s 
assault on Pericles (Mem. 3.5), the closer targets seem to be the more recent 
expression of democracy in the (itself problematic) Lysian funeral speech and elitist 
responses to it.38 Only in the final address to the bereaved does Socrates express 
recognisably Socratic sentiments, encouraging the living to seek their own glory 
(247a2-6) rather than the second-hand praise of the epitaphios. 
Praise of the Athenian character and politeia was the central theme of the Periclean 
funeral speech, in an explicit contrast with Sparta (cf. Thuc. 2.37.1, 39.1-2). Plato 
overturns the order of the democratic funeral speech, as exemplified by Lysias’ 
funeral speech of the 390s, where the discussion of the Athenian politeia covers the 
transition from myth to history (Lys. 2.18-19). He begins with a portrait of the 
Athenian politeia, unrecognisable as Periclean democracy but clearly and explicitly 
an ancestral constitution (238b7-8) based on the Athenians’ noble origins and 
education.  
Plato omits the mythical history fundamental to the genre (perhaps following 
Thucydides), and replaces it with a mythicised politeia, relocating the Athenian 
constitution into mythical pre-history. This is a typical move in ancestral constitution 
arguments; Isocrates places the ancestral constitution in the generation before 
Marathon, at the border of myth and history in the Athenian past (Panegyricus 75).  
Plato’s ironic twist is to suggest that the same ancestral politeia existed both then and 
now (ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ πολιτεία καὶ τότε ἦν καὶ νῦν, ἀριστοκρατία..., 238c5-6 ). As in 
Lysias’ version, autochthony (the element of Athenian foundation myth that Plato 
retains) is cited as the generator of equality between Athenian citizens and thus the 
politeia (Lys. 2.17, Menex. 238e1). However, the resulting constitution is not the 
democracy praised by Lysias, but an aristocracy in which the excellence of leaders is 
mediated through the approval of the people (ἔστι δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μετ’εὐδοξίας 
πλήθους ἀριστοκρατία, 238c7-d2). However, the emphasis on doxa and the 
                                                
37 Monoson 2000: 181-202; Schofield 2010: xx-xxii. 
38 Eucken 2003b: 44; Pradeau 2002: 18-21. 
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suggestion that the politeia is also a monarchy because it still selects ‘kings’ (238d1-
2), suggest that Plato is both parodying the way in which Athens liked to praise itself 
and representing the ancestral constitution as a mixed one.39 The manipulation of 
doxa was central to Isocrates’ teaching, where it was equated to conjecture leading to 
phronesis; Plato’s criticism may extend not just to Athenian political rhetoric but also 
to its other critics.40 
Plato subverts the patriotic distortion of history typical of the genre, questioning and 
satirising Athenian collective celebration of the past; his historical survey (239a-246a) 
passes over the mythical elements (pre-Marathon) in favour of a longer exposition of 
the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars. The Athenian contribution is emphasised and 
exaggerated, and shameful Athenian defeats (such as the Sicilian Expedition) are 
presented as opportunities for the display of individual virtues such as courage 
(243a).41 As Lysias’ positioning of Athens shows (2.20-3, 51-4), the refashioning of 
myth and history was not the sole preserve of democracy’s opponents; orators used 
the popular, Athenocentric version of histories that a mass audience might 
recognise.42 Plato’s more detailed narration sets Athenian decline and decadence in 
the historical past, rather than presenting glory in the mythical past.43 
Whether the Lysian speech, the Menexenus, and the Panegyricus appeared first is 
unclear, but the latter pair represent the first contact in a lengthy argument between 
their authors.44 The Panegyricus was completed over many years’ composition and 
therefore may respond to several events and other works, in a period when orators 
depicted a renewed imperial confidence in Athens.45  
Isocrates presents the Panegyricus as a version of the type of speech performed at 
festivals (panegurides), a genre that used many of the same topoi as the funeral 
speech to eulogise Athens to a Panhellenic audience. His speaker’s goal is to persuade 
non-Athenians to agree that Athens deserves to share leadership of the other Greeks 
                                                
39 Kahn 1963: 226.  
40 Poulakos 2004: 46-52. 
41 Pownall 2004: 49-58 
42 Grethlein 2010: 108-13; Nouhaud 1982: 105-11. 
43 Pradeau 2002: 20-26. 
44 Eucken 1983: 162-5; Todd 2007: 157-64. 
45 Dion. Hal. Comp. 25.206-12; Usher 1990: 19-21. 
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with Sparta.46 Together they could lead the unified Greeks to attack the Persians (157-
75), one of Isocrates’ key political policies, although one complicated by his 
ambiguous views on Sparta.47  
Isocrates draws attention to the speech’s complexity and difference from other public 
speeches (Panegyricus 11-14); the speech cannot be delivered as written, because of 
its length and complex composition. Isocrates’ laboured prose with its long periods, 
carefully balanced clauses and antitheses, and use of metrical rhythms implicitly 
confirms this.48 Ober interprets Isocrates’ written work (notably the Antidosis) as a 
fictionalised literary re-performance of real events; his (probably historical) antidosis 
trial is re-imagined as trial of his life and teaching, equating him with Socrates.49 But 
Ober’s use of Skinner’s application of speech-act theory to political texts, which 
flattens the distinction between performance and publication, fails to accord enough 
significance to the specific performance context of Plato and Isocrates’ engagement 
with politics.50 Their non-performance in the public sphere is itself an act of political 
elitism; advisers like Isocrates could influence Athens’ leaders outside the democratic 
framework of the courts or assembly through their private teaching and writings.   
Isocrates often represented himself as incapable of successful participation in 
democratic debate because of his ‘insufficient voice’ (To Philip 81); but, as Too 
demonstrates, this is a rhetorical ploy to explain how he chose to speak privately to 
his elite students through his teaching, rather than to participate actively in Athenian 
politics.51 While Isocrates is not, like Plato, an explicit rejectionist of Athenian 
democracy, his elitist political views conflict with the versions of Athenian 
democracy expressed by supporters such as Lysias; he recognises that Athenians will 
struggle to distinguish his views from those of oligarchs (Areopag. 57, 70). He 
acknowledges the good in other types of constitution, ‘speaking’ in the persona of 
monarchs (Nicocles, Archidamus), and advising and eulogising them (Ad Nicoclem, 
Evagoras). While Lysias names the Athenian constitution as democracy, Isocrates 
                                                
46 Jaeger 1939: 74-8. 
47 Dillery 1995: 54-8; Gray 2000: 154. 
48 Usher 2010: 88-91 
49 Ober 1998: 257-60, 2004: 35-7. 
50 Ober 1998: 33-8; Skinner 2002: 103-27. Judith Butler’s analysis of the politics of the performative 
offers an alternative model: Butler 1997. 
51 Too 1995: 84-9. 
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tends to refer to it as a politeia (Panegyricus) and only to mention democracies in 
general rather than Athens specifically (Areopagiticus 60). 
Isocrates incorporates the Athenian ancestral constitution, despite declining to call it 
democracy, into his argument as a source of Athenian superiority (Panegyricus 34-
40). After delineating Athenian claims to superiority through the myths of 
autochthony (21-7) and Demeter at Eleusis (28-33), Isocrates argues that Athens 
served as a protector for other Greek communities, spreading its culture through 
colonisation (34-7). Its antiquity renders its hegemony more long-standing, more 
patrios (ἡγεµονίαν... πατριωτέραν, 37) than any other city could claim. As the first 
polis to establish laws and a politeia (πρώτη γὰρ καὶ νόµους ἔθετο καὶ πολιτείαν 
κατεστήσατο, 39), Athens set an example (παράδειγµα) for the rest of Greece.  Athens 
also established the first courts (40, a reference to the Areopagus).  
While Plato attempts to undermine history as a support for Athenian claims to good 
government and leadership through a change of focus, Isocrates stays closer to this 
source model, elaborating the events that typically feature in eulogies of the city 
rather than replacing them.52 He uses the standard mythical examples of the 
epitaphios to show Athenian superiority in helping the mythical heroes and founders 
of other cities (Heraclids 61; Thebans 64-5; Eumolpus 68). This culminates in the 
historical Athenians making the common cause of Xerxes’ invasion their private 
concern by responding promptly when other cities did not (86), an outrageous 
revision of events. Such use of private resources for the communal good is a key 
feature of fourth-century elitism (Areopagiticus 24, Xen. Cyn. 12.10, 13.11). 
The present generation are denied the share of ancestral virtue that Lysias grants them 
(παιδευθέντες µὲν ἐν τοῖς τῶν προγόνων ἀγαθοῖς, 2.69); for Isocrates, this virtue was 
last instantiated in the Marathon generation, whose parents receive Isocrates’ most 
specific praise (75, 78-84). This pushes the period of greatness back into the sixth 
century, a period that seems to exist on the boundary of myth and history in the 
Athenian imagination. Isocrates chooses not to mention any of the turbulent changes 
in the Athenian constitution usually attributed to this period (for example in Ath. Pol. 
13-22), whereas Lysias describes democrats driving out their oppressors (Lys. 2.18-
19). 
                                                
52 Hamilton 1979: 293-5; Welles 1966: 11-17. 
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Isocrates follows this with a detailed comparison of the roles of Sparta and Athens in 
the Persian Wars (85-98), returning to his argument that they should have joint 
leadership of a new Panhellenic war against the Persians (99). While Isocrates might 
be reworking his historical evidence for rhetorical purposes, Welles argues that the 
adaptation of the past to suit current ends was typical of the fourth-century use of the 
past, and cites inscriptions that recreate or invent lost decrees of the past as a similar 
type of evidence.53 The didactic historians of the fourth century presented highly 
selected and distorted historical evidence in much the same way, shaping events to 
serve their editorial purposes, as Dillery and Pownall show for Xenophon, Ephorus 
and Theopompus.54 That Plato and Isocrates should reshape history for argumentative 
purposes in their reworking of a genre already expected to rewrite history with a 
patriotic slant is hardly surprising. 
Xenophon and Sparta as an ancestral constitution 
Xenophon demonstrates the start of the process by which present-day constitutions 
were rejected in favour of idealised past ones, with his attempt to rehabilitate the 
Laconists’ idealised Sparta as an ancestral constitution. Xenophon cannot simply 
present fourth-century Sparta as an alternative to Athens; he has to place his model 
Sparta in an imprecise past, a move that is typical of ancestral constitution arguments. 
His model differs from other Athenian ancestral constitution arguments only in that 
Sparta rather than Athens itself is the subject of its re-imagining of history. The Lac. 
Pol. was probably written in the 360s along with most of Xenophon’s other work, and 
probably post-dates the Panegyricus and Menexenus.55 Xenophon is characterised by 
Ollier as ‘le laconisant par excellence’.56 While the subtle ambiguities of his analysis 
belie this, Sparta remains central to Xenophon’s thought; an idealised depiction of 
Spartan education also underlies and informs his idealised portrait of Cyrus in the 
Cyropaedia.57 
Xenophon’s assessment of Sparta is often negative or ambivalent, as his depiction of 
its leaders suggests.58 Spartan leaders are violent bullies who fail to treat their citizen 
                                                
53 Welles 1966: 3-11, giving the ephebic oath stele from Acharnae (RO88) as an example. 
54 Dillery 1995; Pownall 2004: 65-175. 
55 Gray 2007: 42-3; Lipka 2002: 9-13; Ollier 1934: xviii-xix, xxviii-xxix. 
56 Higgins 1977: 65-75; Humble 2004: 220-2; Ollier 1973: 373. 
57 Luccioni 1948: 139-74; Tuplin 1994: 151-61. 
58 Anabasis 1.5.11-14, 2.6.7-15. 
  Carol Atack 
Lucy Cavendish College 
15/06/2010 13 of 41 
troops – or other Greeks – as citizens, beating them like slaves. This behaviour fails to 
maintain discipline, leading to defeat, as exemplified by Clearchus, and especially by 
Mnasippus at Corcyra, whose brutality to his officers and failure to prevent his troops 
sliding into luxuriousness result in a failure to maintain the hoplite line and thus 
defeat through failure of Spartan character (Hell. 6.2.5-23).59 Xenophon’s critique of 
the failures of individual Spartan leaders stands in for his criticism of Spartan 
imperialism as a whole; in Xenophon’s elitist political theory leaders represent the 
character of their whole polity or group.60 The characterisation of Critias in the 
Hellenica is a further example; Critias is shown praising Sparta as the best 
constitution while authorising brutality and illegal executions in Athens (Hell. 2.3.24-
6, 34). Likewise, lawgivers impart character to their constitutions. 
Ollier and others were able to see Xenophon as a pure Laconist by rejecting the unity 
and structure of the Lac. Pol., which contains one chapter criticising present Spartans 
for their failure to live up to the laws of Lycurgus.61 Chapter 14 has been regarded as 
an interpolation, a later revision misplaced in the transmission of the text, or an 
editing failure.62 However, the uncomfortable transition to chapter 14 and its radical 
reassessment of present-day Sparta are integral to the work’s structure and argument, 
as Momigliano and others have shown.63  
The highly rhetorical opening of the Lac. Pol. sets up a complicated relationship 
between past and present, Xenophon and Lycurgus, and Xenophon and the reader, 
while introducing the idea that the Spartan politeia has unique strengths. Xenophon’s 
first-person musing on Sparta passes from aorist to imperfect to present tense 
(ἐθαύµασα... ἐθαύµαζον... θαυµάζω... 1.1-2) as he explains how he ceased to be 
astonished at the life-style of the Spartans and now reserves his astonishment for the 
capabilities of Lycurgus. In obeying Lycurgus’ laws the Spartans achieved 
eudaimonia; these laws in turn are the opposite of the practices of other Greek cities 
(1.2). Sections 1.3-10.8 fill out the details of the effect of the Lycurgan laws on 
Spartan life from conception to old age, emphasising the differences between Spartan 
and other Greek lifestyles; here Xenophon ambiguously blurs past and present. 
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Lycurgus is in the past (ἡγήσατο, 1.4), and good Spartans usually are, but other 
Greeks and bad elements in Sparta (such as greedy women, βούλονται, 1.9) are in the 
present.  
Xenophon’s argument (clearly rather clumsily made, given the problems it has caused 
its many interpreters) is that Lycurgus’ laws have in the past produced a cohesive and 
successful society, but that the current, corrupt instantiation of Sparta has failed to 
adhere to the source of its unique strength, obedience to the Lycurgan nomoi. The two 
premises of this argument appear in chapters 1 and 14 respectively.64  
The opening proposition is echoed and answered in chapter 14; Xenophon no longer 
wonders, but understands (νῦν δ’ἐπίσταµαι, 14.4) how Sparta has failed, and indeed 
there should be no amazement at all (οὐδὲν µέντοι δεῖ θαυµάζειν, 14.7), because the 
Spartans clearly no longer obey the Lycurgan laws. But the tone of the debate with 
the reader is changed by the counterfactual construction of 14.1: ‘Εἰ δέ τίς µε ἔροιτο... 
οὐκ ἂν ἔτι θρασέως εἴποιµι.’ Earlier, in the introduction to the military section (11-
13), Xenophon can happily answer the inquirer about the causes of Spartan military 
superiority (εἰ δέ τις βούλεται καταµαθεῖν... ἔξεστι καὶ τούτων ἀκούειν, 11.1). Here, 
the question cannot be answered ‘boldly’, but its uncertain answer throws the 
preceding parts of the treatise into an imagined past. The past action of Lycurgus’ 
nomothesia and Spartan obedience is finally clearly separated from the less ideal 
present, and presented as a counterfactual alternative. Xenophon is not asking the 
Athenians to choose the current Sparta, the hateful imperial power, but a past 
idealisation of it.  
The ancestral constitution model enables Xenophon to maximise the role he gives to 
Lycurgus, a semi-mythological figure whom he credits with a far greater role in the 
design of the Spartan politeia than earlier sources do, to the extent that Lycurgus, the 
dominant figure in 1.2-10.8, becomes a mouthpiece for Xenophon’s own political 
thought (for example, when Xenophon reports Lycurgus’ thoughts at 2.3, 3.2, 4.1).65 
Lycurgus appears, unusually, at the start of Spartan history, contemporary with the 
Heraclids, who also feature in Athenian civic mythology, rather than as a later 
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reformer. This follows the fourth-century stress on the process of enacting laws and 
interest in the codification of law and the exploration of history as a source of moral 
paradigms; the equivalent process among constructors of Athenian ancestral 
constitutions is to stress the role of Solon.66 Although Xenophon considers the 
politeia in its broadest aspect, he regards the nomoi enacted by his Lycurgus as the 
means by which it was created and maintained. 
Xenophon later uses his mythicised model of Sparta to support other arguments, 
notably his equation of justice with obedience to the law.67 This is a key principle of 
Xenophon’s Socrates, who uses Lycurgan Sparta as an example when arguing about 
the nature of justice with Hippias (Memorabilia 4.4.15). Xenophon’s other main use 
of his imaginary Sparta is in Memorabilia 3.5, where Socrates encourages the 
younger Pericles to become a military and political leader in Athens; this is part of a 
series of short dialogues (3.1-7) in which Socrates encourages elite participation in 
Athenian political life.68 Pericles is dismissive of Athens’ capabilities (3.5.4) and the 
benefits of participation in its political processes, in a series of criticisms of Athens 
which culminate in a negative comparison of Athens with Sparta (3.5.15-17); Athens 
can never hope to equal Sparta in obedience and respect to elders, and is thus 
condemned to a public life of constant quarrelling rather than striving towards 
common goals in unanimity. 
Socrates’ response to the younger Pericles’ Laconist position is protreptic rather than 
dialectic, and works its way through the topoi of funeral speeches.69 While the text 
signals an ironic contrast between the democratic values of Thucydides’ Pericles and 
Xenophon’s Laconist Pericles the younger, Socrates’ contribution is more obviously a 
response to Plato and Isocrates’ eulogies, discussed below. In all of these speeches the 
ancestral constitution is an important theme, as are the mythicisation and blurring of 
the Athenian past to which it is attributed. 
As with Isocrates’ and Plato’s pseudo-public speeches, embedded in the Panegyricus 
and Menexenus respectively, Xenophon emphasises the mythical base of Athenian 
superiority in its status as first-founded city, its autochthony and its monarchical past 
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(3.5.10-12). The important move that Xenophon gives to Socrates is to equate the 
idealised Athenian past (of ancestral constitution arguments) with the idealised 
Spartan present (of Laconism) and to substitute the former for the latter (3.5.14). 
Rather than stressing the values and achievements of Athenian democracy, Xenophon 
attaches virtue to a timeless, mythological past by using the funeral speech’s Athenian 
foundation myths, and institutions praised in ancestral constitution arguments, such as 
the role of the Areopagus council (3.5.20).70  
Xenophon was a supporter, if a critical one, of Athenian democracy, at least as he saw 
it through his elitist lens; despite his fierce criticisms of the Athenians’ treatment of 
their generals in his depiction of the Arginusae trial (Hell. 1.6-7), in works such as the 
Poroi he shows a concern for the maintenance of the Athenian democracy whose 
reestablishment he had celebrated in the Hellenica.71 In the Memorabilia Socrates 
does not criticise the Athenian demos, whose obedience and hard work are noted in 
both a ship-of-state metaphor (3.5.5-6) and references to choral and military training 
(3.5.18); it is the younger ‘Pericles’ who criticises the elite for disobedience (3.5.19, 
21); Socrates’ response is to encourage him to lead them in a revitalised ephebeia 
(3.5.27-28), anticipating a project realised by Lycurgus in the 330s. 
Areopagiticus: the classic ancestral constitution 
Isocrates delivered the classic statement of his ancestral constitution argument for the 
adoption of an elitist form of democracy in the Areopagiticus, following Xenophon in 
relocating the ideal constitution into the past. Isocrates has often been presented as a 
rhetorician whose works are exercises in style with no political content.72 But he 
himself defined his works as politikoi logoi, by which he seems to have meant that 
they were focused on the life of the city rather than on the private concerns and court 
cases he had worked on as a logographer at the start of his career (Soph. 21).73 
However, these speeches were not presented to the Athenian public as part of its 
democratic political process, even when, as with the Areopagiticus, he represents 
them as such.74 Their audience is likely to have been small, private gatherings of the 
elite rather than the mass audience of the Athenian democracy that Isocrates addresses 
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within the text.75 But this audience, at least partly composed of Isocrates’ students, 
was expected to participate in Athenian political life at a high level, as his student the 
general Timotheus did. 
While Isocrates’ speech was not performed in public, the Areopagiticus shows a close 
engagement with and response to the events and ideas of its time and it aimed to 
influence elite opinion through its dissemination as a written text.76 It probably dates 
from the opening stages of the Social War in 357 BCE.77 Isocrates suggests that short-
term military success and overconfidence are preventing Athens from confronting its 
longer-term failure both as a self-sufficient polis and a hegemonic power (1-2). He 
draws on the now-mature concept of politeia to assess the state of Athens and to 
prescribe changes, drawing on Plato’s city-soul analogy to describe the politeia as the 
soul and practical reason of the city (ἔστι γὰρ ψυχὴ πόλεως οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ πολιτεία, 
τοσαύτην ἔχουσα δύναµιν ὅσην περ ἐν σώµατι φρόνησις, 14) and to use the city as a 
large-scale representation of events (6).  
But unlike Plato, with his utopian model of Kallipolis and ethical rather than 
historical theory of political change, Isocrates anchors his utopian construction in a re-
imagined, mythicised version of pre-Marathon Athens. At first Isocrates plays with 
the identity of his ideal city; the past constitution he is going to praise, the un-walled 
city with a low population, could very well be that of Sparta (13), renowned for both 
qualities.78 Ambiguous references to Sparta are a characteristic of Isocrates’ political 
writing, with which he exploits the difference between his sophisticated readership 
and the supposed mass audience of the speeches contained in his work.79 
Isocrates’ ancestral constitution contains institutional features familiar in elitist texts: 
selection of magistrates by election from pre-qualified shortlists (designed to exclude 
pro-oligarchs) rather than by lot (22-3), and a political culture in which the properly 
valued elite took office as a liturgy rather than an opportunity for profit (24). Most 
importantly, the Areopagus Council held supervisory powers over education and civic 
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life (37-8).80 This extends its role as a repository for ethical excellence that Xenophon 
(Mem. 3.5.20) had already given it far beyond its historical extent.81 At the time 
Isocrates was writing, the Areopagus was a religious and homicide court, presided 
over by the basileus archon. The leisured elite were over-represented in its 
membership of former archons, making it an elite of wealth and status rather than of 
achievement, pointing to a difference between Isocrates’ and Xenophon’s elitism.82  
But Isocrates is fundamentally interested not in institutions but in ethos and values, 
the major shift he contributes to patrios politeia arguments; the purpose of his 
Areopagus Council is to promote his selected values.83 It oversees the education of 
elite citizen youth (43-5), which Isocrates believes to be under-supervised in his own 
Athens (another implied contrast with Sparta), and it also monitors the behaviour of 
the entire citizen body (46-9), encouraging good character and behaviour.84 
He expands the details through a negative comparison of paideia then and now, 
focusing on the degenerate political character of present Athens (ἡγεῖσθαι τὴν µὲν 
ἀκολασίαν δηµοκρατίαν, τὴν δὲ παρανοµίαν ἐλευθερίαν, τὴν δὲ παρρησίαν 
ἰσονοµίαν, τὴν δ’ἐξουσίαν τοῦ ταῦτα ποιεῖν εὐδαιµονίαν, 20), notably identifying 
παρρησία, key to democracy, as a negative feature. The topos of the corruption of 
thought and language in the decayed politeia suggests Thucydides’ image of stasis 
(Thuc. 3.82.4) and Plato’s description of the decline of democracy (Resp. 8.560c-
61e). By contrast, the patrios politeia demonstrated a more nuanced approach to 
important qualities, such as the two types of equality (δυοῖν ἰσοτήτοιν, 21), a standard 
item of fourth-century elitist thought, and moderation and respect for tradition in 
religious practice (29-30), a fourth-century concern across the political spectrum.85  
In Isocrates’ imagined past there was communality of wealth, in that the wealthy 
invested in and employed the poor, ensuring that there was always work for every 
citizen (55), in contrast to the current arrangements where the impoverished depended 
on state pay for jury service and assembly attendance (54). Again, where institution-
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focused depictions of the Solonian patrios politeia (such as Ath. Pol. 7-9) emphasise 
the four property classes, Isocrates makes a simple distinction between rich and poor. 
Even so, this is not like Aristotle’s economic analysis (Pol. 3.8) but a distinction 
between the ethical values and status of the two groups, similar to the utopian 
constitutions whose analysis of koinōnia Aristotle rejects in Politics II.86 
While the earlier debates on the ancestral constitution seem to have involved a search 
for specific nomoi ascribed to Solon and earlier lawgivers, which could be reinstated 
and displayed in Athens, Isocrates, like other fourth-century conservatives, is opposed 
to the idea of detailed written codes, or at least believes that they can be minimised in 
a state with excellent politeia and well-acculturated citizens (Areopagiticus 39-40, 
Panegyricus 78-81), a Laconist position. For Xenophon the importance of laws and 
lawgiver was a simple connection; the mandatory system of citizen education 
established by the original lawgiver inculcated the appropriate character that rendered 
continuing law-making unnecessary.87 Plato shows a more complex situation in the 
Laws, where a second-best society requires legislation, but the lawgiver aims to 
minimise codified law with the use of argument and persuasion of intermediate status 
(7.822d-3d). For Isocrates, it is not so much Solon’s written laws as the habits of the 
Athenians (ἐπιτηδευµάτων, 40) that are the source of the Athenian patrios politeia’s 
strength.88 
The emphasis on the collective Areopagus rather than individual lawgivers such as 
Solon differentiates Isocrates from Xenophon, and his promotion of Lycurgus; the 
Aristotelian Ath. Pol. emphasises Solon’s role much more (Ath. Pol. 7-12).89 In 
promoting the collective agent of the law rather than the individual lawgiver, Isocrates 
opens up a further Spartan comparison, with the Gerousia, the council of Spartan 
elders. This reopens the question as to whether Isocrates is simply an oligarch, or an 
opponent of democracy, which he acknowledges is a concern (57).90 Here, his lengthy 
response sets out how present democratic Athens is superior to the oligarchic Athens 
of the Thirty (itself a Spartan-inspired and backed, self-selected Gerousia copy) (63-
70). Isocrates’ disingenuous explanation for the Spartan echoes in all these 
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arrangements is that the Spartan system is likewise democratic (61); the nature of the 
democratic element in the Spartan mixed constitution was a topos of fourth-century 
theory. Aristotle reported opposed views that placed it either in the political structure 
of the ephorate or the social structure of the communal messes and education system 
(Pol. 4.9.1294b13-41). 
Like Xenophon’s Sparta, Isocrates’ Solonian constitution is curiously detached from 
the history that connects it to the degenerate present: he omits any description of 
Pericles’ or Ephialtes’ reforms, returning instead to another panegyric-style retelling 
of mythical history (74-6), linking his constitution to the mythical past rather than to 
actual history. Perhaps a couple of years later, he would take a different approach in 
On the Peace, believed to date from Athens’ defeat in the Social War a couple of 
years later in 355 BCE.91 Here Isocrates clearly depicts the degradation of Athenian 
democracy under the demands of ruling an empire (41-56), and dissociates Athens 
from its mythical past, arguing that the current citizens are not descended from the 
original autochthonous Athenians (88). He contrasts excellent ancestors who should 
be emulated – the Persian war generation – with those who should not – the more 
recent ‘Decelean’ war generation (37-8). The downbeat tone matches that of 
Xenophon’s Poroi, which depicts the economic distress of the city; the need for 
improved models of leadership highlights Athens’ loss of confidence in its generals, 
in this period of multiple eisangelia prosecutions, including that of Isocrates’ pupil 
Timotheus.92   
Throughout his long career Isocrates turned to his own imaginary pseudo-historical 
and the mythical Athenian past, locating his ideal constitution in the ancestral politeia 
he found there. While he presents himself as a patriotic Athenian, he is aware of his 
readership’s fond attachment to the idea of the Spartan constitution. The structural 
games played in the Areopagiticus, where he unconvincingly attempts to rebrand 
Sparta as a democracy (61), suggest that he is aware that his ideal Athens looks very 
much like an idealised Sparta. But there are enough points of contact between 
Isocrates’ arguments and those of his contemporaries – and indeed of Aristotle – to 
suggest that he was providing a knowing readership with satisfying material, and his 
many references to poverty suggest an engagement with Athens’ economic 
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situation.93 Despite his utopian approach and disdain for participation, Isocrates 
anticipated the real trend for an increase in the Areopagus’ judicial power that 
accelerated after the Areopagiticus’ publication, although he would no doubt have 
preferred that power to be mediated through the indirect influence of paideia rather 
than the blunt tool of apophasis.94 
Plato’s Timaeus/Critias – owning the ancestral constitution 
Plato responds to Isocrates’ developed ancestral constitution argument in the 
Timaeus/Critias, where once more he mixes the playful and the serious to position his 
arguments on Athenian politics. Eucken argues that the Timaeus answers Isocrates’ 
attack on Plato’s political philosophy in his Busiris, where a constitution similar to 
that of Kallipolis is represented as the work of an Egyptian monarch renowned for 
cruelty and tyranny (Busiris 15-27).95 However, Plato seems to be aiming at a broader 
target, patrios politeia arguments based on Athenian history, with his inventive 
depiction of a past Athens forgotten by the Athenians, who know only the names of 
kings and heroes of that era, but none of the details of their deeds (Crit. 109d-110c).96  
Rather than follow others in using and re-inventing the shared history and myths of 
the Athenians, as he did in the Menexenus, Plato playfully creates his own set of 
myths, which turn the ideal constitution he invented in the Republic into the ancestral 
constitution of Athens. In doing so, he questions and undermines Isocrates’ grounding 
of his arguments in mythicised Athenian history. Gill and others have noted that the 
dialogue appears to parody the patrios politeia, without explaining why Plato might 
have done so here; but the links between the ancestral constitution Plato presents and 
the rest of the dialogue suggest that Plato is demonstrating that arguments based on 
history are inferior to those based on cosmology.97 
The dramatic setting of the dialogues emphasises both the focus on Athenian politics 
and the idea of taking political debate out of the public arena. The speeches, like that 
in Isocrates’ Panegyricus, are festival speeches, presented orally but in private (Tim. 
26e-27a), at a party held in Athens during the Panathenaea, the great festival of 
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Athens’ patron goddess (Tim. 21a). This improves upon the Republic’s dramatic 
setting, where the discussion takes place in the Piraeus at a new festival for the 
imported cult of Bendis (Resp. 1.327a). The Timaeus begins with Socrates 
summarising his speech of the previous day, a version of the constitution of Kallipolis 
(although without the philosopher kings), and expressing a desire to see his model in 
action (Tim. 17c-19b). Critias has recalled that he has heard a story of a similar 
constitution when he was a child, retold from a story told to his great-grandfather by 
Solon (Tim. 20d-21a). 
Critias’ description of the great and astonishing deeds of this Athens (µεγάλα καὶ 
θαυµαστὰ τῆσδ’ εἴη παλαιὰ ἔργα τῆς πόλεως, 20e) echoes both Herodotus’ opening 
and Xenophon’s response to Sparta and Lycurgus (Lac. Pol. 1.1-2). Socrates has also 
said that he would like to hear speakers present a contest of cities (Tim. 19c); 
Isocrates opens his own version of a festival speech with a complaint about the lack of 
competitive opportunities for speakers (Panegyricus 1-2). Aristotle saw the 
identification of τα θαυµαστά as a good strategy for opening epideictic speeches 
(Rhet. 1415b1-3), and Plato marks these stories as display rhetoric by using this 
formula.  
At the playful level, Plato concentrates attention on the transmission and telling of 
Critias’ contribution. The story told by Solon has the authority of a written text, 
through its transmission in Egypt, but also the weakness of a copied recital, in its 
transmission within Critias’ family and Critias’ own performance of it. Critias’ 
performance is a recreation, a valid means of transmitting the oral genre of myth, but 
also a lifeless copy, inferior to Timaeus’ spontaneous exposition of his own thoughts 
on cosmology, which provides the serious level.98 As well as the distinction between 
public and private, oral and written discourse, Plato seems to apply his ontological 
hierarchy of being and becoming to types of discourse. 
This story is one that Solon specifically failed to include in his didactic poetry, and 
presented only as a private discourse to his friend, Plato’s and Critias’ ancestor 
Dropides (Tim. 21c-d). For Solon, poetry was a diversion (παρέργῳ, 21c4), and 
dealing with Athenian stasis left him too busy to develop his account of ancient 
Athens. Critias claims that his speech will take the city and citizens described by 
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Socrates as a myth (ὡς ἐν µύθῳ) and show them as the truth (ἐπὶ τἀληθές, 26c7-d2), 
and assertion of the story’s truth is repeated many times.99 Morgan argues that its 
plausibility shows that it is a potential charter myth or noble lie for a reinvigorated 
Athens, with the potential to take shape as the type of didactic poetry of which Plato 
approves.100 However, Plato’s emphasis on Critias’ reconstruction and recital of the 
remembered story suggests that he is also pointing up its weaknesses and that this 
playful section will be outweighed by Timaeus’ contribution, the serious.101 
The true Solonian constitution, it would seem, is not the one enacted in the Athenian 
democracy and displayed on public inscriptions and in Solon’s published poetry, but 
one created for the city by Athena (Tim. 24c) and privately communicated to Plato’s 
ancestors.102 It has in a sense become Plato’s own patrios politeia, received orally 
from his teacher and from his family; Critias regards the coincidence between Solon 
and Socrates’ accounts as divinely inspired (ὡς δαιµονίως, 25e).  
Plato compares the written transmission of the story preserved in the Egyptian temple 
with Solon’s orally transmitted and less accurate stories of the origins of Athens, 
representing written analysis as superior to oral discussion and debate. Plato answers 
Isocrates’ Egypt argument by showing that the Egyptians use this constitution because 
they learned of it at their foundation 8000 years ago; the primeval Athens in which it 
was used was destroyed 9000 years ago (Tim. 23d-24a). The Egyptian priest who 
explains this to Solon makes several jibes about the Athenians’ ignorance of their own 
history, explaining that the natural cycle of floods and destructions has destroyed their 
knowledge of their own past, leaving them like children (Tim. 21b-23d). That 
ignorance of history causes poor analysis is a recurring criticism of Athenian 
democratic debate (cf. Thuc. 6.54-59), but here Plato uses his hierarchy of discourse 
to suggest that political analysis grounded in cosmology is more powerful.  
The description of Athens’ physical landscape reinforces its link with cosmology: 
Athena had also selected Athens’ physical setting as the most likely to produce 
excellence (Tim. 24c-d, Crit. 109c-d).103 But the emphasis on landscape also has a 
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playful role, cloaking primeval Athens in a Spartan setting, suggested by the fertile 
land, lack of temples, and lack of reliance on the sea (Crit. 110d-111d). The physical 
locations of Athenian democracy, such as the Pnyx, are subsumed under an expanded 
acropolis, which is occupied only by the warrior class, excluding the farmers and 
artisans from the city (Crit. 111e-112c).104 The primeval Athenians rose from 
different earth, and were eventually swallowed by it, in a playful reversal of the 
autochthony myth (Tim. 25c6-d3).105 
Primeval Athens is only half of the model included in the myth; its rival Atlantis plays 
an important role too, revealed by Critias when he resumes the narration of the story 
after Timaeus’ cosmological speech (Crit. 108e-109a). As Vidal-Naquet explained in 
detail, Atlantis represents fifth-century Athens with its wealth, mining (worthless 
‘mountain copper’ rather than Laurion silver), grandiose public buildings and 
maritime empire.106 Plato uses this imagined conflict between his idealised primeval 
Athens and Athens at the start of its decline to promote his own view of Athenian 
politics, matching Isocrates’ arguments but surpassing him in inventiveness. 
Plato is also able to outdo rival analysts of political constitutions by grounding his 
political philosophy within his detailed cosmology. The city is not (or perhaps not 
just) a large-scale model of the human soul, but a small version of the cosmos. 
Xenophon regards geometry and astronomy as subjects to be pursued only for limited 
practical purposes, while Isocrates regards them as intellectual training of little 
practical value.107  
However, Plato’s bold and playful move in re-inventing the ancestral constitution as 
his own, investing Solon with secret Egyptian knowledge and Socrates with divine 
inspiration, is offset by the abandonment of the Critias. The third dialogue of the 
projected trilogy, the Hermocrates, which would perhaps have included an analysis of 
the failings of Athenian democracy from the Sicilian general, seems never to have 
been written. Ironically, however, it is the non-ideal and degenerate Atlantis that has 
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taken on a life of its own in utopian political thought and in popular culture through 
the ages.108 
Plato’s Laws 3 – the ancestral constitution as jeu sérieux 
Plato’s later work also bears the signs of Athens’ loss of confidence after its defeat, 
and the long years of poverty that marked the 350s, the final stage in Plato’s career. 
The grand narrative of Athenian victory in the Critias was abandoned, and the 
alternative project of the Laws is concerned with the practicalities of what is 
achievable by a lawgiver applying the ideal to the circumstances that pertain 
(4.708ad), rather than a search for the ideal best itself.109 The ability to propose and to 
do what is opportune in the circumstances (kairos) was the goal of Isocrates’ 
educational programme, and Plato seems to suggest that this more limited goal is the 
achievable one.110  
The central content of the work, the development of a law-code for a proposed 
colony, Magnesia in Crete, is again wrapped within a complex presentation, which 
examines the relationship between written and unwritten law, compulsion and 
persuasion, and the role of history in political argument, through the conversation of 
three elderly men as they attempt to amuse themselves on a walk to Zeus’ shrine in a 
Cretan cave. After examining the weaknesses of Sparta and Crete, and presenting a 
typology of constitutions through a pseudo-historical survey, the Athenian Stranger 
describes to his Spartan and Cretan companions a lawgiver who creates a constitution 
with many similarities to the fourth-century idea of a Solonian ancestral constitution. 
The unnamed stranger himself plays a similar role to that of the travelling Solon the 
sage in Herodotus, whom Croesus greets as Ξεῖνε Ἀθηναῖε.111  
The Laws was for a long time overlooked as a dull and excessively lengthy work of 
its author’s declining years.112 But Plato seems to regard it as exemplifying the 
mixture of playfulness and seriousness that is the expression of the divine in humans 
(θαῦµα... θεῖον, εἴτε ὡς παίγνιον ἐκείνων εἴτε ὡς σπουδῇ τινι συνεστηκός, 1.644d7-
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9).113 Weil highlights the importance of this interplay between playfulness and 
seriousness, describing the Laws as a ‘jeu sérieux’.114 The exploration of history and 
the design of constitutions are amusements particularly suited to the elderly 
discussants (3.685a6-b1, 4.712b1-2); just like Solon in Critias’ story, they become 
παῖδες πρεσβῦται.    
The contrast between spoken rhetoric and written law is played with in the final parts 
of the Laws, but even before that the differences between written and unwritten law 
and good and bad constitutions are emphasised. The opening of the Laws itself plays 
with ideas of genre, beginning with the word Theos as if it were an inscribed Athenian 
decree (which in the fourth century usually began with the formula theoi inscribed as 
the first line).115  
By playing with the genres of public speech, Plato finds a way to write down the 
unwritten laws of an ancestral constitution, in the form of the spoken preambles that 
persuade and exhort rather than compel (for example, the law on hunting, 7.824a11-
19 and its preamble, 7.823d3-824a9).116 But he also plays down the role of the 
lawgiver that is emphasised in ancestral constitution models. Solon and Lycurgus are 
not named in the historical section, despite many allusions to them – only the Persian 
kings are named there. Both are named later, in comparison with Homer and Tyrtaeus 
as writers of didactic poetry, when the Athenian Stranger is considering how laws 
should be written, in what genre and how they need to surpass a city’s other literature 
(9.858e-859b). Chance, opportunity and the divine are more important factors in the 
success of a constitution than the lawgiver (4.709b7-9), unless exceptional 
circumstances produce a man with unusual personal authority (4.711d-712a), inviting 
the reader to consider whether there are any genuine examples of this. The work of 
the lawgiver – in the shape of the conversation of books 4-12 – is likened to the type 
of mythos that would be spoken by an oracle (4.712a4), although later it also becomes 
the type of written text that should be read as part of the Magnesian paideia (7.811c-
812a).   
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Although Plato showed in the Menexenus and the Timaeus/Critias that history was, 
for him, an inadequate analytical tool, he uses it in the Laws to show both the 
importance of kairos for legislation, and the limits of historical models. Adopting the 
structures of the fourth-century genre of universal history, he fits his examination of 
the defective ancestral constitutions of Athens, Sparta and Persia, and their lawgivers, 
into a (highly selective) survey starting at the last cataclysm, and in doing so presents 
a Platonic criticism of ancestral constitution arguments in Xenophon and Isocrates.117 
For Plato, historical events, so easily distorted in their retelling, are just as fallible a 
guide to truth and virtue as the everyday world is to that of the reality of the Forms. 
Starting with an imagined prehistoric pre-polis age, the Athenian Stranger works his 
way through the development of different types of human association, as larger and 
more complicated groupings of individuals, families and villages emerge from the 
destruction of all human society by the flood. Plato uses the generic elements of 
history subversively; while Thucydides presented his Archaeology to show the 
uncivilised nature of pre-polis early society (Thuc. 1.1-23), Plato inverts this and 
makes this society the closest to the ideal. The first ‘constitution’ described as 
ancestral is the most primitive, first society of small family units (3.678e-679e), 
similar to the pre-political system of the Homeric Cyclopes (3.682b3-c1, Od. 9.105-
115). This is developmentally prior to Socrates’ first, minimal city (Resp. 2.369c-
370e); here Plato asserts that its δυναστεία (3.680b2) counts as a kind of constitution, 
from which aristocracy will eventually emerge (3.681c7-d5).118  
Plato marks primitive δυναστεία as an ancestral constitution in several ways. While 
there are no written laws (οὐδὲ... γράµµατα, 3.680a5), there are unwritten habits and 
laws transmitted orally from ancestors (or perhaps, habits and laws which are said to 
be patrios) (ἔθεσι καὶ τοῖς λεγοµένοις πατρίοις νόµοις, 3.680a6-7). Authority is 
literally patriarchal, belonging to the parents and being passed down (3.680d7-e4); it 
is classified here as a kind of kingship. Plato is taking the idea of patrios nomos and 
entirely removing it from the history of the polis, placing it instead at the start of the 
historical cycle in something like a Hesiodic golden age, where there is no need of 
lawgivers (3.680a3-4) and everyone lives happily. The lack of money and thus greed 
is a further sign of an ideal constitution; because humans have lost the skill of mining 
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and access to their mines (3.678e-679c), there are no metals and therefore none of the 
greed or corruption that caused Atlantis’ downfall.  
Plato presents this early society as the human society most like the ‘age of Cronos’ 
the Athenian Stranger describes (as a muthos) as existing in an earlier cycle (4.713a-
714b), where citizens lived in obedience to divine spirits in the same sort of 
relationship that herds of animals have to their human controllers. Good constitutions, 
he argues, replicate that relationship through the institution of law, which retains 
some of the divine element. The successful creation of an ancestral constitution is 
taken out of human hands and the historical era, and attributed to gods outside any 
historical framework. 
The primitive society and the age of Cronos book-end the survey of constitutions, 
which incorporates somewhat schematised versions of familiar stories of Sparta, 
Persian and Athens into his model as the process of nomothesia begins (3.681c4).119 
The Athenian Stranger uses this survey to show that more stable constitutions will 
result where there is a mixture of the two forms of constitution, monarchy and 
democracy, rather than the extremes of each type exemplified by Xerxes’ Persia and 
the decadent version of democratic Athens (3.693de).120 While the Spartan 
constitution exemplifies mixture, its previously identified weakness of aiming at the 
wrong kind of virtue means that it is not an ideal alternative. Plato thus manages to 
incorporate in his historical structure all the constitutions his rivals based on idealised 
versions of historical models (Xenophon’s Sparta and Persia, Isocrates’ ancestral 
Athens) and to demonstrate their failings.121 
While Xenophon depicted the Spartan constitution as an unchanging set of laws 
created by Lycurgus, Plato describes it as a changing system adapted by multiple 
lawgivers, following his pattern of downplaying the individual historical lawgivers 
praised by others. Sparta’s changes, the doubling of the kingship, the introduction of 
the Gerousia, and of the ephorate, move it from being a pure monarchy to a mixed 
constitution (3.691e-692a). These adaptations protect Sparta from the excesses of 
pure monarchy, caused by the over-concentration of δυναστεία in a single individual, 
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while its fellow Dorian states Argos and Messene suffer from the greed and ignorance 
of their unfettered monarchs. Before these states fell into decline, the Dorian league 
was balanced by the interrelationship between the peoples and kings of each city 
(3.683e-684b); equality also meant that the process of legislation was not divisive, 
with no upheavals caused by legislation for land redistribution or the cancellation of 
debts (3.684d-685a).  
Cyrus’ Persia is presented as a vibrant city whose strong leader capably mixes slavery 
and freedom (3.694a4).122 But the lack of a strong institution of paideia meant that the 
strengths of his politeia were not transmitted to the next generation. This depiction 
clearly draws on Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, but aspects such as the role of free speech 
(3.694b2) and politics carried out εἰς τὸ µέσον (b5) also suggest Periclean Athens. 
Criticism of the lax control of Athenian education is a frequent feature of ancestral 
constitution arguments (cf. Areopagiticus 37), and the detailed management of 
paideia becomes a core feature of Magnesia’s constitution. 
Although Plato attributes Athenian success in the Persian Wars to its ancestral 
constitution, which was still in place and guided the character of its citizens as they 
fought to defend their city and Greece as a whole at Marathon (3.698b), he shows a 
very different city to the epitaphios image of the heroic city at its best. While Solon is 
not named, the Solonian element of four property classes is highlighted as an 
important feature (πολιτεία τε ἦν παλαιὰ καὶ ἐκ τιµηµάτων ἀρχαί τινες τεττάρων, 
3.698b4-5, cf. Ath. Pol. 7.3-4), and reappears in the Magnesian constitution 
(5.744bd).123 But the important principles are not so much the laws of the ancestral 
constitution itself, but the moral culture of aidos, which generated respect for the 
laws, and the fear caused by the magnitude of the Persian threat, which increased 
obedience to the extent that Athenians were willing to be enslaved to their laws 
(3.698bc). Morrow regards this emphasis on aidos as an oblique reference to the 
Areopagus Council and the behaviour it engendered in the Athenians, just as Isocrates 
stressed its moral supervisory role (cf. Areopagiticus 37-49).124 Later, an Areopagus-
like Nocturnal Council will be given the same role of moral leadership and 
surveillance over Magnesia’s citizens (12.951d-952c, 961a-968e). 
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This fear and its associated aidos reappeared when the Persians returned and 
threatened Athens again (3.699bc). Obedience to the ancestral laws powered a further 
Athenian defeat of the invaders, although the battles here are not named, nor the 
different role of the Athenian demos in naval victory. However, the force that united 
the Athenians was fear (φόβος, 3.699c2), so that there was no distinction between the 
brave and cowards – hardly a resounding celebration of Athens’ finest hour. The 
Athenian Stranger seeks to distinguish Athens’ success under its ancestral 
constitution, when obedience to the laws was a kind of voluntary slavery, and the 
demos was in partial control (3.700a3-5), from its later decline, but his historical 
example depicts grim desperation rather than the rule of reason.125 Just as the Persians 
were more like Athenians, Plato shows how easily historical examples can be 
distorted by showing the obedient Athenians as more like Xenophon’s ideal Spartans 
(despite their latter-day failure to follow Lycurgus’ laws). Notably this first mention 
of the demos triggers the account of Athens’ decline.  
The ancestral constitutions presented in Laws III are all shown to be defective 
representations, except for the most primitive kind, which resembles the divine 
institutions of the age before the flood. The association that Plato valorises is not 
Athens, Sparta or Persia, but a pre-political mythical age; Homer, the basis of 
traditional Athenian education, depicted the Cyclopes as man-eating brutes, not noble 
savages. The Laws recalibrates the balance between nomoi and politeia, 
acknowledging the need for nomoi in the imperfect world where the ideal constitution 
of Kallipolis cannot be achieved, but whether the Athenian Stranger’s lawgiver is one 
of the exceptionally gifted lawgivers or not is left open. 
De-democratising the ancestral constitution – the final moves 
Just as Plato stepped back from his depiction of powerful primeval Athens as the 
model for the ideal society, Isocrates readjusted his ancestral constitution model to 
account for the weakening of Athens after 355. The shifts in the balance of power 
between the Greek poleis were becoming less important as Philip’s Macedon came to 
dominate the region. Isocrates’ final adjustment to his ancestral constitution model, 
therefore, re-orients it towards monarchy. The Panathenaicus’ unwieldy structure and 
excessive length have led some to dismiss the elderly Isocrates as senile, but Isocrates 
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uses the topos of old age to emphasise the theme of revision.126 Moreover, it contains 
two important aspects of Isocrates’ political thought, the attribution of the Athenian 
ancestral constitution and democracy to Theseus, and a complex analysis of Isocrates’ 
attitudes to Sparta. 
While the ancestral constitution model in the Areopagiticus relies upon the 
idealisation and distortion of a historical model through a somewhat Laconist lens, the 
version presented in the Panathenaicus, Isocrates’ last major work, follows Plato’s 
mythicising moves as well as bringing the idea of the monarch back into Athenian 
political discourse. The idea of Theseus as a democratic king itself had a long history 
(e.g. Thuc. 2.15.2-6); Athenians attributed early developments in their polis to him. 
Euripides had presented Theseus on the Athenian festival stage as a mouthpiece of 
democratic ideology (Supp. 403-62), and Isocrates had long since eulogised his 
contributions to Athens (Helen 18-38), and specifically his role in setting up a 
common state for his fellow citizens (τῶν συµπολιτευοµένων, 35). This model of the 
establishment of the Athenian politeia reappears in the Panathenaicus, when Theseus 
hands over the state to the people (129) who then establish a patrios politeia 
democracy, which is really a mixed constitution (δηµοκρατίαν... ἀριστοκρατίᾳ δὲ 
χρωµένην, 131).  
This claim introduces the most detailed exposition of Isocrates’ political theory, in 
which he sets out the threefold model of constitutions but emphasises the contrast 
between good and bad leadership in possible versions (132-3). However, the detailed 
analysis serves perhaps to obscure the way that Isocrates has based the politeia he 
praises on mythical origins. Athenian foundation myth, rather than the hazy history of 
the Solonian era, is emphasised.127 While depictions of Solon straddle the boundaries 
of history and myth, this story of Theseus and his abdication in favour of the Athenian 
aristocracy is entirely mythical, although Theseus’ political role appears to have 
featured in the lost part of the Ath Pol.128  
By placing Theseus at the heart of the foundation of the Athenian politeia, Isocrates 
develops an ingenious defence against accusations of Laconophilia (152), arguing that 
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Lycurgus’ Spartan constitution is a copy of the Athenian one, and the Gerousia a copy 
of the Areopagus Council (153-4). Isocrates acknowledges this outrageous inversion 
of his earlier arguments, which remodelled the Areopagus as a Gerousia, through the 
rhetorical device of a critical Spartan student, who counters that Isocrates has 
duplicitously attacked Sparta to disguise his admiration for the city (235-9).129 
Isocrates uses the dialogue form and educational setting to redefine his thoughts on 
Sparta as philosophy rather than practical politics, but by this stage Sparta is such a 
spent historical force that it is safe for Isocrates to acknowledge that his thought on 
Sparta is ambiguous.  
Although many commentators argue that Isocrates’ patrios politeia arguments had 
little effect, Isocrates seems to have documented a change in Athenian political 
mentality shown in the increasing role of the Areopagus in the fourth-century 
democracy.130 Inscription and literary evidence show it supervising religious disputes, 
and it was also guardian of the laws.131 But Eucrates’ tyranny decree of 337/6, not 
long after the council gained the new power of apophasis in an initiative supported by 
Demosthenes, suggests that there was some unease about the increase in the 
Areopagus’ power, and its relationship to the elite; among other measures, the decree 
forbade the Areopagus from meeting at times of political turmoil.132 Athens, 
weakened by its defeat by Macedon at Chaeronea (338), was well on the way to 
abandoning democracy, and a strong Areopagus with broad legal powers made that 
more possible.  
Conclusion 
The idea of the ancestral constitution provided a space within which Athenian 
democracy could be attacked and alternatives debated, after the restoration of 
democracy and reconciliation. The re-imagined past was a safer model in which to 
explore elitist and other alternative constitutions without the taint of oligarchy or 
Sparta. Xenophon’s defence of the Spartan constitution displays some ambivalence in 
projecting Spartan excellence back into the past. Isocrates, on the other hand, uses his 
loyalty to Athens and its glorious mythical past to escape accusations that his model 
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of an elitist democracy is really a Spartan-inspired oligarchy. Both writers seem to 
look to the limits of the historical past.  
Plato mocks the idea that the Athenian historical past can be the basis for political 
excellence by satirising both the past itself and its use in civic discourse, through the 
medium of the funeral speech in the Menexenus. Both Xenophon and Isocrates adopt 
public civic discourse in a similar way, translating the rhetoric of the public display 
speech into conversations between Socrates and his pupils, or to Isocrates’ readership, 
by repurposing the genres of spoken rhetoric into new literary forms. Isocrates in 
particular plays on the distinction between the public audience internal to his speeches 
and the private external audience, acknowledging the ambiguity of his arguments. 
Ancestral constitution arguments changed throughout the century. Their origin in the 
dispute between oligarchs and democrats at the end of the Peloponnesian War was 
quickly transcended, although the popular appeal to ancestral custom retained its 
political power. After Athens weakened in the 350s, the basis for ancestral 
constitution arguments, or perhaps the need for them, also weakened. Before Athens’ 
defeat Isocrates presented an Athenian collective body, albeit the elitist and 
aristocratic Areopagus Council, as a source of good customs; Plato stepped back from 
his narrative of the victory of primeval Athens, and after dismissing historical 
constitutions in the Laws he returned to a model based on divine inspiration. 
Isocrates’ acknowledge the increasing importance of Philip of Macedon with his 
growing emphasis on the monarchical origins of the patrios politeia. 
  
  Carol Atack 
Lucy Cavendish College 
15/06/2010 34 of 41 
Bibliography 
Primary texts 
Allen, T. W., ed. (1917-19), Homeri Opera: Odyssea, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon). 
Broadie, S. and Rowe, C. (2002), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Burnet, J., ed. (1900-07), Platonis Opera, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon). 
Bywater, I., ed. (1894) Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea (Oxford: Clarendon). 
Cartledge, P., ed. (1997), Xenophon: Hiero the Tyrant and Other Treatises, trans. R. Waterfield 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin). 
Cawkwell, G. L. (1979), Xenophon: A History of My Times (Hellenica), trans. Rex Warner 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin). 
Cooper, J. M. and Hutchinson, D. S., eds. (1997), Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett). 
Diels, H. and Kranz, W. (eds.) (1951), Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker: Griechisch Und Deutsch, 2 
vols. (Berlin: Weidmann). 
Duke, E. A. et al., eds. (1995), Platonis Opera, vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon). 
Hicks, R. D., ed. (1925) Diogenes Laertius: Lives of eminent philosophers, 2 vols. (London: 
Heinemann) 
Hude, C., ed. (1927), Herodoti Historiae, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon). 
Jones, H. S. and Powell, J. E., eds. (1942), Thucydidis Historiae, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon). 
Kenyon, F. G., ed. (1920), Aristotelis Atheniensium Respublica (Oxford: Clarendon). 
Lamb, W. R. M., ed. (1930), Lysias (London: Heinemann). 
Maidment, K. N., ed. (1941) Minor Attic Orators, vol. 1 (London: Heinemann). 
Marchant, E. C., ed. (1900-1920), Xenophontis Opera Omnia, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon). 
Norlin, G. and Van Hook, L., eds. (1928-45), Isocrates (London: Heinemann). 
Oldfather, C. H., et al., eds. (1933-), Diodorus of Sicily, 12 vols. (London: Heinemann). 
Perrin, B, ed. (1914-26), Plutarch: Lives, 11 vols. (London: Heinemann). 
Ross, D., ed. (1957), Aristotelis Politica (Oxford: Clarendon). 
Saunders, T. J., ed. (1970), Plato: The Laws (Harmondsworth: Penguin). 
Slings, S. R., ed. (2003), Platonis Respublica (Oxford: Clarendon). 
Stalley, R. F., ed. (1995) Aristotle: Politics, trans. E. Barker (Oxford: Clarendon) 




  Carol Atack 
Lucy Cavendish College 
15/06/2010 35 of 41 
Secondary literature 
Baynes, N.H. (1955), Byzantine Studies and Other Essays (London: University of London, Athlone 
Press). 
Bobonich, C. (1996), 'Reading the Laws', in C. Gill and M.M. McCabe (eds.), Form and Argument in 
Late Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 249-82. 
Bons, J.A.E. (1993), 'ΑΜΦΙΒΟΛΙΑ: Isocrates and Written Composition', Mnemos., 46 (2), 160-71. 
Bordes, J. (1982), Politeia Dans La Pensée Grecque Jusqu'à Aristote (Paris: Belles Lettres). 
Bringmann, K. (1965), Studien Zu Den Politischen Ideen Des Isokrates (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. 
Ruprecht). 
Brisson, L. (1998), Plato the Myth Maker, trans. G. Naddaf (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press). 
Butler, J.P. (1997), Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York, NY: Routledge). 
Cartledge, P. (1999), 'The Socratics' Sparta and Rousseau's', in S. Hodkinson and A. Powell (eds.), 
Sparta: New Perspectives (London: Duckworth), 311-37. 
Cloché, P. (1963), Isocrate Et Son Temps (Paris: Belles Lettres). 
Danzig, G. (2003), 'Did Plato read Xenophon's Cyropaedia?', in S. Scolnicov and L. Brisson (eds.), 
Plato's Laws: From Theory into Practice; Proceedings of the VI Symposium Platonicum 
Selected Papers (Sankt Augustin: Academia), 286-97. 
Derrida, J. (1981), Dissemination, trans. B. Johnson (London: Athlone Press). 
Dillery, J. (1995), Xenophon and the History of His Times (London: Routledge). 
Dobski, B. (2009), 'Athenian Democracy Refounded: Xenophon's Political History in the Hellenika', 
Polis, 26 (2), 316-38. 
Eucken, C. (1983), Isokrates: Seine Positionen in Der Auseinandersetzung Mit Den Zeitgenössischen 
Philosophen (Berlin: de Gruyter). 
--- (1990), 'Der aristotelische Demokratiebegriff und sein historisches Umfeld', in G. Patzig (ed.), 
Aristoteles' 'Politik': Akten Des XI Symposium Aristotelicum, Friedrichshafen-Bodensee, 
25.8.-3.9.1987 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht), 277-91. 
--- (2003a), 'Zum Konzept der πολιτικοì λóγοι bei Isokrates', in W. Orth (ed.), Isokrates: Neue Ansätze 
Zur Bewertung Eines Politischen Schriftstellers (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier), 34-
42. 
--- (2003b), 'Die Doppeldeutigkeit des platonischen Menexenos', Hyperboreus, 9 (1), 44-55. 
Finley, M.I. (1975), 'The Ancestral Constitution', in M.I. Finley (ed.), The Use and Abuse of History 
(London: Chatto & Windus), 34-59. 
  Carol Atack 
Lucy Cavendish College 
15/06/2010 36 of 41 
Fuks, A. (1971), The Ancestral Constitution: Four Studies in Athenian Party Politics at the End of the 
Fifth Century B.C (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press). 
--- (1972), 'Isokrates and the social-economic situation in Greece', Anc. Soc., III, 17-44. 
Gehrke, H.-J. (2006), 'The Figure of Solon in the Athenaion Politeia', in J. Blok and A.P.M.H. 
Lardinois (eds.), Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches (Leiden: 
Brill), 276-89. 
Gill, C. (1977), 'The Genre of the Atlantis Story', Classical Philology, 72 (4), 287-304. 
Gray, V.J. (1994a), 'Images of Sparta: Writer and Audience in Isocrates' Panathenaicus', in A. Powell 
and S. Hodkinson (eds.), The Shadow of Sparta (London: Routledge), 223-72. 
--- (1994b), 'Isocrates' Manipulation of Myth and the Image of Athens, Panegyricus 54ff, 
Panathenaicus 168ff', Prudentia, 26 (1), 83-104. 
--- (2000), 'Xenophon and Isocrates', in C. Rowe and M. Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of 
Greek and Roman Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 142-54. 
--- (2004), 'Le Socrate de Xénophon et la démocratie', Études Philosophiques,  (69), 141-76. 
--- (ed.), (2007), Xenophon on Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Grethlein, J. (2010), The Greeks and Their Past: Poetry, Oratory and History in the Fifth Century BCE 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Hamilton, C.D. (1979), 'Greek Rhetoric and History: the Case of Isocrates', in G.W. Bowersock, W. 
Burkert, and M.C.J. Putnam (eds.), Arktouros: Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard M. W. 
Knox on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday (Berlin: W. de Gruyter), 290-98. 
Hansen, M.H. (1975), Eisangelia: The Sovereignty of the People's Court in Athens in the Fourth 
Century B.C. and the Impeachment of Generals and Politicians (Odense: Odense University 
Press). 
--- (1990a), 'The Size of the Council of the Areopagos and its Social Composition in the Fourth 
Century BC', C&M, XLI, 73-77. 
--- (1990b), 'Solonian democracy in fourth-century Athens', in Aspects of Athenian Democracy 
(Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press), 71-99. 
--- (1999), The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology 
(2nd edn.; Bristol: Bristol Classical Press). 
--- (ed.), (2005), The Imaginary Polis: Symposium, January 7-10, 2004 (Copenhagen: Det Kongelige 
Danske Videnskabernes Selskab). 
Harding, P. (1973), 'The Purpose of Isokrates' Archidamos and On the Peace', California Studies in 
Classical Antiquity, 6, 137-49. 
Harvey, F.D. (1965), 'Two kinds of equality', C&M, XXVI, 101-46. 
  Carol Atack 
Lucy Cavendish College 
15/06/2010 37 of 41 
--- (1966), 'Corrigenda to C&M XXVI 1965 101-146', C&M, XXVII, 99-100. 
Held, D. (2006), Models of Democracy (3rd edn.; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press). 
Higgins, W.E. (1977), Xenophon the Athenian: The Problem of the Individual and the Society of the 
Polis (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press). 
Hornblower, S. (2000), 'Sticks, stones, and Spartans: the sociology of Spartan violence', in H. van 
Wees (ed.), War and Violence in Ancient Greece (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales), 57-82. 
--- (2008), A Commentary on Thucydides: Volume III, Books 5.25-8.109 (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Humble, N. (2004), 'The author, date and purpose of Chapter 14 of the Lakedaimoniôn Politeia', in C. 
Tuplin and V. Azoulay (eds.), Xenophon and His World: Papers from a Conference Held in 
Liverpool in July 1999 (Stuttgart: Steiner), 215-28. 
Jaeger, W. (1939), Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, ed. G. Highet (Oxford: B. Blackwell). 
--- (1940), 'The Date of Isocrates' Areopagiticus and the Athenian Opposition', Athenian Studies, 
Presented to William Scott Ferguson (New York, NY: Arno Press), 409-50. 
Jouët-Pastré, E. (2001), 'Le Jeu de l'Écriture du Phèdre aux Lois', in F.L. Lisi (ed.), Plato's Laws and 
Its Historical Significance: Selected Papers of the I International Congress on Ancient 
Thought, Salamanca, 1998 (Sankt Augustin: Academia), 33-40. 
--- (2006), Le Jeu Et Le Sérieux Dans Les Lois De Platon (Sankt Augustin: Academia). 
Kahn, C.H. (1963), 'Plato's Funeral Oration: The Motive of the Menexenus', C Phil., 58 (4), 220-34. 
Konstan, D. (2004), 'Isocrates' "Republic"', in T. Poulakos and D.J. Depew (eds.), Isocrates and Civic 
Education (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press), 107-24. 
Kroeker, R. (2009), 'Xenophon as a Critic of the Athenian Democracy', History of Political Thought, 
30, 197-228. 
Lipka, M. (ed.), (2002), Xenophon's Spartan Constitution (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter). 
Livingstone, N. (2001), A Commentary on Isocrates' Busiris (Leiden: Brill). 
Loraux, N. (1986), The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City, trans. A. 
Sheridan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). 
--- (2000), Born of the Earth: Myth and Politics in Athens, trans. S. Stewart (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press). 
Luccioni, J. (1948), Les Idées Politiques Et Sociales De Xénophon (Paris: Ophrys). 
Masaracchia, A. (2003), 'Isocrate e il Mito', in W. Orth (ed.), Isokrates: Neue Ansätze Zur Bewertung 
Eines Politischen Schriftstellers (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier), 150-68. 
  Carol Atack 
Lucy Cavendish College 
15/06/2010 38 of 41 
Mathieu, G. (1925), Les Idées Politiques D' Isocrate (Paris: Belles Lettres). 
McNamara, C. (2009), 'Socratic Politics in Xenophon's Memorabilia', Polis, 26 (2), 223-45. 
Momigliano, A. (1936), 'Per l'unità logica della Λακεδαιµονίων πολιτεία di Senofonte', RFIC, n.s. 14, 
170-73. 
Monoson, S.S. (2000), Plato's Democratic Entanglements: Athenian Politics and the Practice of 
Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). 
Morgan, K.A. (1998), 'Designer history: Plato's Atlantis story and fourth-century ideology', JHS, 118, 
101-18. 
--- (2003), 'The Tyranny of the Audience in Plato and Isocrates', in K.A. Morgan (ed.), Popular 
Tyranny: Sovereignty and Its Discontents in Ancient Greece (Austin: University of Texas 
Press), 181-213. 
--- (2004), 'The education of Athens: politics and rhetoric in Isocrates', in T. Poulakos and D.J. Depew 
(eds.), Isocrates and Civic Education (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press), 125-54. 
Morrow, G.R. (1960), Plato's Cretan City: A Historical Interpretation of the Laws (Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press). 
Mossé, C. (1978), 'Le Thème de la Patrios Politeia dans la pensée grecque du IVème siècle', Eirene, 
16, 81-89. 
--- (1979), 'Comment s'élabore un mythe politique: Solon, "père fondateur" de la démocratie 
athénienne', Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 34 (3), 425-37. 
Naddaf, G. (1994), 'The Atlantis Myth: An Introduction to Plato's Later Philosophy of History', 
Phoenix, 48 (3), 189-209. 
Nicolai, R. (2004), Studi Su Isocrate: La Comunicazione Letteraria Nel IV Sec. a.C. E I Nuovi Generi 
Della Prosa (Roma: Quasar). 
Nightingale, A.W. (1993), 'Writing/Reading a Sacred Text: A Literary Interpretation of Plato's Laws', 
C Phil., 88 (4), 279-300. 
--- (1995), Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
--- (1999), 'Historiography and Cosmology in Plato's Laws', Ancient Philosophy, 19, 299-326. 
Nouhaud, M. (1982), L'utilisation De L'histoire Par Les Orateurs Attiques (Paris: Belles Lettres). 
Ober, J. (1998), Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). 
--- (2004), 'I, Socrates...the performative audacity of Isocrates' Antidosis', in T. Poulakos and D.J. 
Depew (eds.), Isocrates and civic education (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press), 21-43. 
  Carol Atack 
Lucy Cavendish College 
15/06/2010 39 of 41 
Ollier, F. (1973), Le Mirage Spartiate: Étude Sur L'idéalisation De Sparte Dans L'antiquité Grecque 
(New York, NY: Arno). 
--- (ed.), (1934), La République Des Lacédémoniens (Lyon: A. Rey). 
Osborne, C. (1996), 'Space, Time, Shape and Direction: Creative Discourse in the Timaeus', in C. Gill 
and M.M. McCabe (eds.), Form and Argument in Late Plato (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), 179-211. 
Ostwald, M. (1955), 'The Athenian Legislation against Tyranny and Subversion', TAPA, 86, 103-28. 
Pocock, J.G.A. (1987), The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical 
Thought in the Seventeenth Century (2nd edn.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Poulakos, T. (2004), 'Isocrates' Civic Education and the Question of Doxa', in T. Poulakos and D.J. 
Depew (eds.), Isocrates and Civic Education (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press), 44-65. 
Pownall, F.S. (2004), Lessons from the Past: The Moral Use of History in Fourth-Century Prose (Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press). 
--- (2007), 'From Orality to Literacy: the Moral Education of the Elite in Fourth-Century Athens', in C. 
Cooper (ed.), Politics of Orality: (Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece, Vol. 6) (Leiden: 
Brill), 235-49. 
Pradeau, J.-F.o. (2002), Plato and the City: A New Introduction to Plato's Political Thought, trans. J. 
Lloyd (Exeter: University of Exeter Press). 
Rhodes, P.J. (1992), A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (2nd edn.; Oxford: 
Clarendon Press). 
--- (2005), 'Democracy and its Opponents in Fourth-Century Athens', in U. Bultrighini (ed.), 
Democrazia e antidemocrazia nel mondo greco: atti del Convegno internazionale di studi: 
Chieti, 9-11 aprile 2003 (Alessandria: Ed. dell'Orso), 275-89. 
--- (2006), 'The Reforms and Laws of Solon: an Optimistic View', in J. Blok and A.P.M.H. Lardinois 
(eds.), Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches (Leiden: Brill), 248-60. 
Rhodes, P.J. and Osborne, R. (2003), Greek Historical Inscriptions: 404-323 BC (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
Robb, K. (1994), Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece (New York, NY: Oxford University Press). 
Rowe, C. (2000), 'The Politicus and other dialogues', in C. Rowe and M. Schofield (eds.), The 
Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), 233-57. 
Ruschenbusch, E. (1958), 'ΠΑΤΡΙΟΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ: Theseus, Drakon, Solon und Kleisthenes in 
Publizistik und Geschichtsschreibung des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.', Historia, 7 (4), 398-
424. 
  Carol Atack 
Lucy Cavendish College 
15/06/2010 40 of 41 
Salkever, S.G. (1993), 'Socrates' Aspasian Oration: The Play of Philosophy and Politics in Plato's 
Menexenus', The American Political Science Review, 87 (1), 133-43. 
Schofield, M. (2006), Plato: Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
--- (ed.), (2010), Plato: Gorgias, Menexenus, Protagoras, trans. T. Griffith (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
Sinclair, R.K. (1988), Democracy and Participation in Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press). 
Skinner, Q. (2002), Visions of Politics (Vol. 1; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Tigerstedt, E.N. (1965), The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell). 
Todd, S.C. (ed.), (2007), A Commentary on Lysias, Speeches 1-11 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Todorov, T. (1990), Genres in Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Too, Y.L. (1995), The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates: Text, Power, Pedagogy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Tritle, L.A. (1988), Phocion the Good (London: Croom Helm). 
Tuplin, C. (1993), The Failings of Empire: A Reading of Xenophon Hellenica 2.3.11-7.5.27 (Stuttgart: 
Steiner). 
--- (1994), 'Xenophon, Sparta and the Cyropaedia', in A. Powell and S. Hodkinson (eds.), The Shadow 
of Sparta (London: Routledge), 127-64. 
Usher, S. (2010), 'Eurhythmia in Isocrates', CQ, 60 (1), 82-95. 
--- (ed.), (1990), Isocrates: Panegyricus and To Nicocles (Warminster: Aris & Phillips). 
Vidal-Naquet, P. (1964), 'Athènes et l'Atlantide. Structure et signification d'un mythe platonicien', Rev. 
Ét. Grec., LXXVII, 420-44. 
--- (2005), L'Atlantide: petite histoire d'un mythe platonicien (Paris: Belles Lettres). 
Wallace, R.W. (1986), 'The Date of Isokrates' Areopagitikos', Harv. Stud., 90, 77-84. 
--- (1989), The Areopagos Council, to 307 B.C (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press). 
Walters, K.R. (1976), 'The 'Ancestral Constitution' and Fourth-century Historiography in Athens', 
AJAH, 1, 129-44. 
Weil, R. (1959), L'"archéologie" De Platon (Paris: C. Klincksieck). 
  Carol Atack 
Lucy Cavendish College 
15/06/2010 41 of 41 
Welles, C.B. (1966), 'Isocrates' View of History', in L. Wallach (ed.), The Classical Tradition: Literary 
and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 3-
25. 
Yunis, H. (1996), Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press). 
 
 
 
